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THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL WATERWAYS:
AN APPROACH TO A SUEZ CANAL SOLUTION
Widespread concern over the present Suez Canal crisis reflects the
critical importance of major narrow "international" I waterways in world
commerce. The relative importance of each waterway as a navigable
channel depends on the existence of a favorable trade pattern between areas
connected by the way, the comparative inconvenience of alternate routes
and the narrowness of the channel. All three factors combine to accentuate
the vital position of the Suez Canal, whose recent blockage seriously
disrupted an interdependent world economy.
2
Any plan for restoration of order in the canal zone, and hence in the
Middle East, must include a full revision of the Constantinople Convention
of 1888,' the major international agreement controlling the Suez Canal.
This convention is ambiguous, 4 unrealistic,5 antiquated 6 and too narrow
in scope 1 and application.8 A fair, yet practicable, revision must reflect
the needs and desires of the relevant interest groups, the efficacy of past
and present legal controls, and the limitations as well as potentialities of
such a convention as an instrument of peace. Legal principles will be
derived primarily from treaties,9 customary law 10 and unilateral regula-
1. Straits and canals, though often wholly within the territorial jurisdiction of a
single state, are "international" in the sense that other nations find them useful for
navigational purposes. See Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949]
I.C.J. Rep. 4, 161.
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1957, p. 1, col. 6; N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1957, p. 47,
cols. 3-5; N.Y. Times, Jan. 13, 1957, § 4, p. 6, col. 1; Wall Street Journal, Feb. 18,
1957, p. 1, col. 1.
3. Hereinafter cited as Constantinople Convention. The text of the convention has
been reprinted in U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 16 (1956) (here-
inafter cited as THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM) ; 3 Am. J. INT'L L. 123 (Supp. 1909);
35 DEP'T STATE BULL. 617 (1956) ; N.Y. Times, Sept. 13, 1956, p. 12, cols. 3-6.
4. See, e.g., problem of discrimination discussed in text at note 149 infra.
5. See particularly the restrictions imposed upon a belligerent Egypt discussed in
text at notes 85, 96, 105 infra.
6. Aside from the need to modernize terminology, the convention needs to be
redrafted in the current economic, military and political context, with due regard for
such international institutions as the United Nations and the International Court of
Justice. See text at notes 111-16, 188-91, 205, 217 infra.
7. The entire matter of canal tolls, in particular, received no mention in the Con-
stantinople Convention. See text at note 197 infra.
8. See notes 9, 22 infra.
9. The three major inter-oceanic canals have been regulated primarily by inter-
national treaty arrangements, said to impose "servitudes" on the riparian power. FEN-
WICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 398 (3d ed. 1948); REID, INTERNATIONAL SERVITUDES IN
LAW AND PRAcTIcE 137-39 (1932). At present only the United States, Great Britain
and Panama are treaty-bound to respect rights of passage through the Panama Canal,
for "a third state cannot incur legal obligations under a treaty to which it is not a
party." ROXBURGH, INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS AND THIRD SRATEs 29 (1917). See
also id. at 19, 29-31, 71. The United States concluded the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, Nov.
18, 1901, 32 STAT. 1903, T.S. No. 401 (hereinafter cited as Hay-Pauncefote Treaty),
with Great Britain, and the Hay-Bunau Varilla Treaty, Nov. 18, 1903, 33 STAT. 2234,
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tions 11 governing all canals of major importance as international water-
ways, viz, the Panama, Suez and Kiel canals.' 2
BACKGROUND OF THE PRESENT CRISIS
Suez Canal History 13
A brief review of Suez Canal history is necessary for a better under-
standing of recent events and the current alignment of interest groups.
When the canal opened in 1869, operation was committed to the Universal
Suez Canal Company pursuant to a ninety-nine year concession.' 4 A
fifteen per cent royalty 15 and forty-four per cent stock interest 16 held by
Egypt assured that country's sympathy with the new company's efforts in
seeking more traffic and higher tolls. As use of the canal gradually
T.S. No. 431 (hereinafter cited as Hay-Varilla Treaty), with the Republic of Panama.
Only a few of the currently powerful countries are obligated in respect to Suez Canal
traffic by the Constantinople Convention. See note 22 infra. But see 1 WHEATON, INTER-
NATIONAL LAW 520 (6th ed. 1929) wherein it is suggested that minor powers may
be bound by tacit consent. Furthermore, it is doubtful whether the Kiel Canal remains
subject to the Treaty of Peace With Germany, June 28, 1919, S. Doc. No. 51, 66th
Cong., 1st Sess. 483-85 (hereinafter cited as Treaty of Versailles). See Kiel Canal
Collision Case, German (British Zone) Supreme Court, [1950] INT'L L. REP. 133,
134 (Lauterpacht ed. 1956). However, it is reported that the Kiel Canal is currently
operated in accordance with Versailles Treaty provisions. Letter from Renate
Kalischer, Inter-Nationes, Bonn, Germany, to the University of Pennsylvania Law
Review, March 8, 1957, on file in Biddle Law Library. Finally, only the Constantinople
Convention and the Treaty of Versailles may reasonably be interpreted as conferring
navigational rights on third parties. ROXBURGI, op. cit. supra at 51-54, 57, 58, 63-71;
Secretary of State Dulles' News Conference, Sept. 26, 1956, 35 DEP'T STATE BULL.
543, 545 (1956).
10. Customary international law may develop through prolonged practice among
nations, which may in fact be consistent with provisions of relevant treaties. See Rox-
BURGH, op. cit. supra note 9, at 94-95, 103; 1 WHEATON, op. cit. supra note 9, at 521.
Consequently, one author, at least, has suggested that the right of passage through
international canals is no longer derived from treaties imposing servitudes, but from
over a half-century of custom. See Baxter, Passage of Ships Through International
Waterways in Time of War, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187, 214-15 (1956).
11. See 35 C.F.R. §§ 1-30 (1949) (Panama Canal); UNIVERSAL SUz MAUTIMt
CANAL COMPANY, RULES Op NAVIGATION (1953) (Suez Canal).
12. Some of the rules regulating traffic through international straits provide useful
analogies and will herein be given footnote treatment. As to whether the artificial
nature of canals demands a unique set of governing principles, compare Lawrence, The
Suez Canal in International Law, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAw 37, 38-40, 44-45
(1884), with HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAw 277 (1898). Of course, many
of the legal controls governing international canals should, and do, parallel those
controlling international straits. See Baxter, supra note 10, at 187.
13. For history of the Suez Canal, see, e.g., HALLBERG, THE SUEZ CANAL (1931);
WILSON, THE SUEZ CANAL (1933). For a short but valuable historical account of the
Suez Canal as a waterway, see Hoskins, The Suez Canal as an International Water-
way, 37 AM. J. INTL L. 373 (1943).
14. Act of Concession of the Viceroy of Egypt for the Construction and Operation
of the Suez Maritime Canal and Appurtenances Between the Mediterranean Sea and
the Red Sea, Nov. 30, 1854, art. III, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 1, 2 (hereinafter
cited as Act of Concession, 1854) ; Act of Concession of the Viceroy of Egypt, and
Terms and Conditions for the Construction and Operation of the Suez Maritime Canal
and Appurtenances, Jan. 5, 1856, art. XVI, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 4, 7 (here-
inafter cited as Act of Concession, 1856) ; Convention Between the Viceroy of Egypt
and the Compagnie Universelle du Canal Maritime de Suez, Feb. 22, 1866, art. XV,
THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 9, 15.
15. Act of Concession, 1854, art. V; Act of Concession, 1856, art. XVIII.
16. Purchased by Egypt in 1858. See WiLsoN, THE SUEz CANAL 22 (1933).
1957]
716 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
mounted, the expanding group of users became increasingly aware of the
high tolls and the economic importance of the canal. Consequently, Great
Britain, the major user country, moved to secure her interest by pur-
chasing the Egyptian Khedive's shares of stock in 1875,17 thereby obtain-
ing a voice on the company board of directors, and by later remaining in
occupation of Egypt after suppressing a local revolt in 1882.18 Egypt's
interests were almost completely divorced from those of the company
when, in 1880, the Khedive was forced to relinquish the fifteen per cent
royalty to cover outstanding debts. 19 Nevertheless, the users' concern
over protection of their vital inter-oceanic channel continued. Although
the 1856 concession required the company to grant free and equal passage
to all merchantmen,20 the user nations incorporated a series of guarantees
of passage for all ships at all times into a multilateral convention 21 signed
by the Powers 2 at Constantinople in 1888. Great Britain, however, made
a reservation to the convention, preventing interference with British ac-
tivity in Egypt.
23
Although the British withdrew their reservation to the convention in
1904,24 the influence of Great Britain in Egypt remained at a high level
through 1914, when the former declared Egypt a British protectorate. 25
Since World War I, British influence in Egyptian and canal affairs has
decreased at an accelerated pace: in 1922 the protectorate was ended and
Egypt declared independent; 26 in 1947 the British completed withdrawal
from all Egypt save the canal zone; 27 in 1954 all British troops withdrew
from the canal zone; 2 8 in late 1956 British prestige in the area reached
17. Id. at 44-58.
18. Id. at 63-64.
19. The Suez Canal, Egyptian Embassy Press Release, Aug. 10, 1956, p. 8. How-
ever, in 1937 and 1949, the Canal Company agreed to increase Egyptian personnel,
and promised substantial annuities to Egypt. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF
INTERNATIONAL LAv 819-23 (1941); ScHONFELD, THE SUEZ CANAL IN WORLD
ArFAIAs 131-32 (1953).
20. Act of Concession, 1856, arts. XIV, XV.
21. See note 3 supra.
22. Signatories were Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Great Britain, Italy,
Netherlands, Russia, Spain and Turkey. See note 9 supra.
23. See Hoskins, supra note 13, at 377.
24. Declaration Between the United Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and
Morocco, April 8, 1904, art. VI, 1 Am. J. INT'L L. 6, 7-8 (Supp. 1907).
25. ScHoNrmLD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 69.
26. Id. at 75.
27. ScHoNFILD, op. cit. supra note 19, at 120. Termination of the British military
occupation of Egypt was agreed to in the Treaty of Alliance Between the United
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and Egypt, Aug. 26, 1936, art. I, 173
L.N.T.S. 402, 404. Occupation of the Suez Canal zone was retained under article
VIII, id. at 406.
28. Pursuant to the Agreement Between the Government of the United Kingdom
of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Egyptian Government Regarding the
Suez Canal Base, art. I, THt Suzz CANAL PRoBLSm 20, 21. See Selak, The Suez
Canal Base Agreement of 1954, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 487 (1955). Egypt announced
abrogation of the 1954 agreement on January 2, 1957, to be effective as of October 31,
1956, the date of the first Anglo-French attack. The British Foreign Office, however,
has denied the validity of any such attempted abrogation. N.Y. Times, Jan. 3, 1957, p.
1, col. 2.
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE SUEZ CANAL
its low with withdrawal, at the insistence of the United Nations, of Anglo-
French invasion forces. 20  Ironically, Great Britain's economic reliance on
the Suez Canal has simultaneously increased, as her industrialized economy
has grown dependent upon oil obtained principally from Middle East
sources while her trade patterns, necessitating passage through the canal,
have remained basically the same.
Since 1948, Egypt has begun to assert fully her position as littoral sov-
ereign by preventing Israeli ships and "contraband" from moving through
the canal. A United Nations Security Council resolution of 1951 30 con-
demning this action has gone unheeded and unenforced. Unlike the dis-
crimination against Israel which, for the most part, affected only the two
countries, the 1956 nationalization 31 of the canal company by Egypt has
touched off the worst crisis in a century of Suez Canal controversy.
Britain and France, fearing higher tolls,3 2 the encouragement given by
such a precedent to the nationalization of Middle East oil sources and the
rising prestige of President Nasser, openly opposed the nationalization,
making fleet and troop movements into the Eastern Mediterranean. Shortly
thereafter, the First London Conference of user nations met 33 and author-
ized a five-nation Suez Committee 34 to present to the Egyptian president
a plan,35 supported by eighteen 36 of the twenty-two nations at the con-
ference, for international operation of the canal. President Nasser rejected
outright any form of international operation,3 7 and proposed instead im-
29. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
30. U.N. Doc. No. S/2322 (1951).
31. For text on the presidential decree, see President of the Republic Order
Concerning the Issuance of Law No. 285 of 1956 on the Nationalization of the Uni-
versal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal, July 26, 1956, THE Sumz CANAL PROB-
LEM 30. Although some Egyptian spokesmen rationalized seizure as necessary to pro-
vide improved canal services, see, e.g., The Suez Canal, Egyptian Embassy Press Re-
lease, Aug. 10, 1956, p. 12, President Nasser explained to the Egyptian people that
large canal revenues would now be made available to finance the projected Aswan
Dam. Address by President Nasser, Alexandria, Egypt, July 26, 1956, TH- Suz
CANAL PROBLEM 25, 27-28, U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 17, 1956, p. 77. For
commentary on the legality of nationalization, see Notes, Nationalization of the Suez
Canal Company, 70 H.Av. L. R v. 480 (1957), A Lawyer Looks at Suez, 100 SoL. 3.
660 (1956).
32. Broadcast by Prime Minister Eden, Aug. 8, 1956, U.S. News & World Report,
Aug. 17, 1956, p. 81.
33. First London Conference sessions were held August 16-23, 1956. See THE
SUEz CANAL PROBLEM 55-293.
34. Australia, Ethiopia, Iran, Sweden and the United States. For a documentary
account of the Committee's Cairo activities, see id. at 303-26.
35. The text of the plan has been reprinted in id. at 307-09; 35 DEP'T STATE BULL.
373 (1956) ; N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1956, p. 6, col. 4. See also Letter from Prime Min-
ister Menzies, Suez Committee Chairman, to President Nasser, Sept. 7, 1956, THE
SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 309, 35 DFP'T STATE BULL. 472 (1956), N.Y. Times, Sept. 10,
1956, p. 6, col. 1.
36. Australia, Denmark, Ethiopia, France, Germany, Iran, Italy, Japan, Nether-
lands, New Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, United
Kingdom and the United States. Those who withheld approval were Ceylon, India,
Indonesia and the U.S.S.R.
37. Letter from President Nasser to Prime Minister Menzies, Suez Committee
Chairman, Sept. 9, 1956, THE Sunz CANAL PROBLEM 317, 35 DEP'T STATE BULL. 472
(1956), N.Y. Times, Sept. 10, 1956, p. 6, col. 6.
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mediate consideration of a meeting to negotiate solutions to questions
relating to: (a) the freedom and safety of navigation in the Canal, (b) the
development of the Canal to meet the future requirements of navigation,
and (c) the establishment of just and equitable tolls and charges.3 8 He
further indicated that such a meeting should be given "the task of re-
viewing the Constantinople Convention of 1888." -9 However, the Sec-
ond London Conference 4 considered these proposals as "too imprecise
to afford a useful basis for discussion." 41 The representatives of the user
governments proceeded to organize formally the Suez Canal Users Asso-
ciation,42 originally planned as a lever to force Egypt to accept international
control, but by then regarded as a consultative body that might facilitate
interim maritime arrangements if Egypt failed to maintain normal canal
traffic. 43
Through exploratory conversations held at the U.N. in late Sep-
tember 1956, the foreign ministers of Egypt, France and the United King-
dom agreed on six basic principles 44 for settlement of the dispute. The
Security Council passed 4- a resolution 46 embodying the six principles,
but the Soviet Union vetoed 47 a British-French proposal for international
operation of the canal.48 Discussion then terminated and the Suez Canal
Users Association resumed organizing functions,49 when Israel invaded
the Sinai peninsula on October 29, 1956.50 Upon the failure of Egypt and
Israel to respond to an Anglo-French cease-fire ultimatum,51 France and
Great Britain bombed the canal area and, notwithstanding a U.N. General
Assembly resolution 52 demanding a cease-fire and withdrawal of Israeli
38. THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 329, N.Y. Times, Sept. 18, 1956, p. 6, col. 4.
39. Ibid.
40. The Second London Conference met September 19-21, 1956. See THZ SuEz
CANAL PROBLEM 353-67.
41. Statement issued by the Second London Conference on the Suez Canal at final
session, Sept. 21, 1956, id. at 366, 35 DzW'T STATE BULL. 507 (1956).
42. Text of Declaration Providing for the Establishment of a Suez Canal Users
Association annexed to Statement issued by the Second London Conference on the
Suez Canal at final session, Sept. 21, 1956, THE Sutz CANAL PROBLrm 365, 35 DZpVT
STATE BULL. 508 (1956).
43. Statement by Secretary of State Dulles at 1st Plenary Session of Second
London Conference, Sept 19, 1956, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEm 353, 355-56, 35 DEP'T
STATE BULL. 503, 504 (1956). See also purposes outlined in the declaration issued at
the Second London Conference providing for the establishment of a Suez Canal Users
Association, cited note 42 supra, and in Secretary of State Dulles' News Conference,
Sept. 26, 1956, 35 DEP'T STATE BULL. 543, 546 (1956).
44. N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1956, p. 1, col. 8. See text at note 64 infra.
45. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1956, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
46. U.N. Doc. No. S/3675 (1956); see 35 DsP'T STATE BULL. 616 (1956).
47. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1956, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
48. See U.N. Doc. No. S/3671 (1956); 35 DEP'T STATE BULL. 616 & n.9 (1956).
49. See Resolution on the Organization of the Suez Canal Users Association, 35
DEP'T STATE BULL. 580 (1956). An administrator for the association was soon ap-
pointed. N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1956, p. 1, col. 6.
50. N.Y. Times, Oct. 30, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
51. N.Y. Times, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
52. U.N. Doc. No. A/3256 (1956). The General Assembly acted pursuant to the
Uniting for Peace Resolution passed by the U.N. General Assembly in November
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forces, invaded the canal zone. After a few days a cease-fire was obtained, 53
and the invading forces withdrew 54 when a U.N. Emergency Force, 55
with Egypt's consent, entered the canal area. In the interim, the canal had
become completely blocked by wreckage.56  While petroleum shortages
threatened the economies of Great Britain and Western Europe, clearance
of the canal was undertaken by the United Nations at Egypt's request.
Egypt opened the canal to most small ships by early April 1957, after
issuing a unilateral declaration of principles governing future canal oper-
ations 5 6' and indicating it would continue to bar Israeli ships.
5 7
Relevant Interest Groups
Any new agreement will probably be negotiated with Egypt by the
governments of the major user nations. Since the closing of the Suez
Canal, all those who ship, produce or deal in commodities normally pass-
ing through the canal have lost income and found their competitive position
threatened by suppliers not dependent upon the canal. 8 Furthermore,
consumers have experienced severe shortages with consequent higher prices
and rationing.P9 The economic dependency of a country such as Great
Britain upon oil and general maritime trade via the canal, and the question
of passage for warships, make the problem immediately one of vital political
concern to that nation and its allies. The self-interest of canal users
requires for them a right of transit subject only to rules designed to provide
safe and speedy passage for all shipping and to protect the "sovereignty"
of the littoral power.
Another major interest is that of the littoral sovereign, Egypt. To
her, the canal is a potential source of revenue and employment, a reason
for recurring foreign occupation of Egypt, a threat to adequate enforce-
ment of customs, immigration and health laws, and an international political
1950, U.N. Doc. No. A/1481 (1950). See statement by Secretary of State Dulles in
the General Assembly, Nov. 1, 1956, 35 DXP'T SATs BuLL. 751 (1956). This course
of action was invoked by seven members of the Security Council immediately follow-
ing the veto by France and Great Britain of a proposed Security Council resolution
calling for an Israeli-Egyptian cease-fire, withdrawal of Israeli forces behind the
established armistice lines and a prohibition on the use or threat of force inconsistent
with the purposes of the United Nations. U.N. Doc. No. A/3256 (1956).
53. Subsequent to a second cease-fire resolution, U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/392
(1956), and preliminary resolutions establishing the United Nations Emergency Force,
see note 55 infra.
54. N.Y. Times, Dec. 23, 1956, p. 1, col. 8. Withdrawal had been demanded by
a General Assembly resolution of Nov. 7, 1956, U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/396 (1956), re-
iterated Nov. 24, 1956, U.N. Doc. No. A/Res/410 (1956).
55. Formed pursuant to General Assembly resolutions, U.N. Doc. Nos. A/Res/391,
394-95 (1956).
56. The canal was blocked by about fifty ships. Some of these were sunk by
bombings but, apparently, most were scuttled by the Egyptians. See N.Y. Times, Nov.
23, 1956, p. 14, col. 3.
56a. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, cols. 4-8.
57. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1957, p. 1, col. 8.
58. See citations at note 2 .ipra.
59. Ibid.
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lever of immense power. Moreover, to Egypt and other members of the
Arab-Asian bloc, foreign control of the canal represents the vestigial
remains of colonialism. Thus, for political and economic reasons the
Egyptian government is likely to insist that it retain operation of the canal
and to concede few limitations on its sovereignty. Presumably desirous
of a sizeable revenue from canal traffic, Egypt will probably want to
minimize the operational expense and charge the highest rates obtainable
for use of the canal.
The Universal Suez Canal Company constitutes a third interest group.
The predominance of non-Egyptian personnel, directors and shareholders
has in the past meant correspondingly less revenue, employment and
political leverage for Egypt. Also, the company has continually sought
high tolls, contrary to the users' self interest. Because of Egypt's na-
tionalization of the company and premature cancellation of the concession,
the company's present interest will probably be restricted to compensa-
tion for its property loss.
The United Nations organization, as representative of the totality of
interests, may be considered to have an important interest of its own in
enhancing its position as an instrument of peace by at least providing
facilities and impartial intermediaries for the negotiation of a new Suez
Canal convention and a permanent resolution of the entire Middle East
crisis. From this view it may be desirable per se to have U.N. organs
aid in the administration of any new agreement. Certainly, the interest of
most free nations in maintaining order in the world community will create
much pressure for permanent settlement of the dispute. This force may
profitably be channeled in part through U.N. institutions. 60
BASES FOR NEGOTIATION: THE SIX PRINCIPLES
A number of plans for permanent resolution of the Suez Canal problem
have been devised by different groups,6' but as yet agreement among the
parties has been limited to six general principles 62 designed to guide
further negotiations. President Nasser's recent unilateral promulgation
of a formula for governing canal affairs 6 impliedly rejects some of these
60. Of course, there are groups whose interests are opposed to those already men-
tioned, e.g., competitors of those relying on the canal, and countries such as the U.S.S.R.
which might benefit from economic embarrassment of national rivals as well as from
general political unrest in the Middle East.
61. See, e.g., the proposal resulting from the First London Conference of users,
see text and citations at note 35 supra; the compromise proposed by India, N.Y. Times,
Oct. 17, 1956, p. 2, cols. 3-5, N.Y. Times, Oct. 20, 1956, p. 8, col. 1; the separate pro-
posals for international operation advanced by a special committee of the Council of
Europe, N.Y. Times, Oct. 18, 1956, p. 12, col. 2 and by the American Association for
the United Nations, open letter from Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chairman, Board
of Governors, Sept. 26, 1956.
62. See text at note 44 supra.
63. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, cols. 4-8. The Nasser government has
failed to take a consistent stand on the six principles. It was reported that President
Nasser recently told King Saud of Saudi Arabia that the prior agreement on the six
principles was "washed out" with the British-French invasion. N.Y. Times, March 1,
1957, p. 1, col. 7. This statement probably surprised many observers, for shortly after
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principles. No doubt this pronouncement as well as other proposals will
be considered in terms of the six principles. Hence suggestions will herein
be oriented to those principles. Prior legal controls will be explored to aid
evaluation of alternate modes of further defining these general propositions.
The six principles are:
"(1) there should be free and open transit through the Canal without
discrimination, overt or covert-this covers both political and
technical aspects;
(2) the sovereignty of Egypt should be respected;
(3) the operation of the Canal should be insulated from the politics
of any country;
(4) the manner of fixing tolls and charges should be decided by
agreement between Egypt and the users;
(5) a fair proportion of the dues should be allotted to development;
(6) in case of disputes, unresolved affairs between the Suez Canal
Company and the Egyptian Government should be settled by
arbitration with suitable terms of reference and suitable provisions
for the payment of sums found to be due." "
I. FREE AND OPEN TRANSIT WITHOUT DISCRIMINATION
Right of Passage When the Riparian Power Is at Peace
The first principle enumerated reflects the primary interest of the users
in the interrelated guarantees of free passage for, and equal treatment of,
all ships, and is in its general form declaratory of existing international law.
Once the high seas were freed for international navigation, 65 the same
liberating influence produced the right of "innocent passage" through
internationally strategic straits located wholly within territorial waters.66
A general right of free passage through inter-oceanic canals for vessels of
war and commerce, during peace and war, conditional upon the flag state
and any state served by the vessel being at peace with the riparian state,
has now become well established in international law through treaty,6
7
the withdrawal of the last Anglo-French invasion forces, Egypt expressed a willing-
ness to continue to adhere to the six general principles in any negotiation on the
Suez Canal; N.Y. Times, Dec. 27, 1956, p. 1, col. 7, and Secretary of State Dulles
recently indicated reliance on the agreement, N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1957, p. 8, col. 6.
However, it has recently been reported that Presideit Nasser is willing to settle all
aspects of the Suez Canal dispute, save that of passage for Israeli shipping, according
to the six principles. N.Y. Times, March 16, 1957, p. 1, col. 8.
64. 35 DEP'T STATE BULL. 616 (1956), N.Y. Times, Oct. 13, 1956, p. 1, col. 8.
65. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIGST Or INTERNATIONAL LAW 653-54 (1941); OclVIM,
INTMNRATIONAL WATERWAYS c. 6 (1920); POTTER, FaEs om or THE StAs (1924);
Lawrence, The Suez Canal in International Law, in MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW 37,
40-41 (1884).
66. Corfu Channel Case, Judgment of April 9, 1949, [1949] I.C.J. Rep. 4; Inter-
national Law Commission, Report, U.N. GENEAL AsszMBL-Y Orr. RXc., 11th Sess.,
Supp. No. 9, at 18-23 (Doc. No. A/3159) (1956); 1 BRETEL, INTxrRNATioNAL STRAITS
98-112 (1947) ; Lawrence, supra note 65, at 41-42.
67. See Constantinople Convention art. I; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. II, § 1;
Treaty of Versailles art. 380.
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custom, 68 judicial decision 69 and endorsement by publicists.70  The creation
of such a user right marks perhaps the most recent stage in the gradual
emancipation of international navigation from control of the individual
national sovereign.
71
Free passage for merchantmen 72 follows from the fact that the canals
were built primarily for the promotion of commercial traffic and the benefit
of nearly all trading countries, and no other ships present less of a risk
to either the canal or the security of the territorial sovereign than do trad-
ing ships. Even though the merchant ship is laden with contraband
destined for a warring nation, its use of the "international" canal is not
incompatible with the neutrality of the riparian sovereign.73
Warships,74 however, present a greater danger to the safe passage of
other ships and to the security of the territorial sovereign. Yet, when
warships of belligerent powers are separated and closely regulated, such
dangers are satisfactorily minimized. A general international right of free
passage for belligerent warships has been created by custom through con-
formity with the universal treaty law allowing passage of such vessels.75
Indeed, prior to the Constantinople Convention, belligerent warships passed
through the Suez Canal during the Franco-Prussian War of 1870-1871,76
and this practice was approved at the 1873 Tonnage Conference. 77 In
1898, after the convention was ratified, Great Britain expressly interpreted
the convention as allowing free access to all ships of both belligerents in
the Spanish-American War.7 8  During the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-
1905, armed Russian vessels freely passed through the Suez Canal in both
directions though operating against Japan, then an ally of Great Britain,
68. See Baxter, Passage of Ships Through International Waterways in Time of
War, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187, 192, 196-98, 200, 215 (1956) ; cf. id. at 192-96, 199-
200 (practice in international straits).
69. Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923).
70. See, e.g., FxNwIcic, INTERNATIONAL LAW 399, 401 (3d ed. 1948).
71. However, the canal must first be built and used for some time before the
sovereign of strategic territory must yield to the international community. Id. at 402;
Baxter, supra note 68, at 191; Lawrence, supra note 65, at 47.
72. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 209, 215; cf. Montreux Convention, July 20,
1936, art. II, 173 L.N.T.S. 213, 219 (hereinafter cited as Montreux Convention); 1
BRftL, INTERNATIONAL STRAITs 101-05 (1947); The Closing and Reopening of the
Dardanelles, 6 Am. J. INT'L L. 706, 707 (1912).
73. See Case of the S.S. "Wimbledon," P.C.I.J., Ser. A, No. 1 (1923).
74. The problem of classifying ships as either vessels of commerce or war is
thoroughly discussed in Baxter, supra note 68, at 210-13. However, under a new
convention, as proposed herein, such a distinction is fundamentally unnecessary. See
id. at 213. Where the classification may prove useful, such as in the imposition of spe-
cial restrictions on vessels in transit for the protection of other shipping and the se-
curity of the local sovereign, it would be wise to follow Professor Baxter's suggestion
that "warships and all types of auxiliary vessels should be defined in a broad sense as
ships operating under public control for hostile or military purposes." Ibid.
75. See id. at 192-200, 215; cf. id. at 192-96 (practice in international straits).
76. Hoskins, The Sues Canal a.s an International Waterway, 37 Am. J. INT'L L.
373, 374 (1943).
77. WILSON, THE Suez CANAL 90 (1933).
78. 2 HAcxWORTH, DIGEST OP INTxRNATIONAL LAw 824 (1941).
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the power in control of the canal.71 Again, in 1911, free and equal access
was afforded both belligerents in the Turko-Italian War.80 Similarly, by
presidential proclamation,"- the Panama Canal remained open s2 to the
passage of belligerent warships during each period of United States
neutrality immediately preceding its entry into both World War I and II. s3
Right of Passage When the Riparian Power Is at War
When the flag state is not at peace with the riparian state, however,
by custom even merchant ships of the former have no general right of
passage.8 4 Only the Constantinople Convention has attempted, and it
unsuccessfuly, to expressly guarantee free passage to all ships at all times.
8 5
On the other hand, the universal practice of barring enemy ships from
passage has been justified with respect to the Kiel and Panama canals
through the Treaty of Versailles and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, respec-
tively. Article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles expressly limited the right
of passage through the Kiel Canal to ships of nations "at peace with
Germany." 86 In article III of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, concluded
between the United States and Great Britain but since observed by all
other user countries,8 7 the United States agreed to render the Panama
Canal "free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all
nations." The United States has consistently interpreted this clause
as allowing closure of the canal to ships of its enemies 8 This construc-
tion seems reasonable when it is observed that the Constantinople Con-
vention's rules for passage of belligerents were fully considered and in
large part expressly adopted by the negotiators of the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty,8 9 so that the omission of an explicit provision allowing passage for
ships of nations at war with the United States was probably intentional.90
In any event, no government has challenged this interpretation.
79. Hoskins, supra note 76, at 377-78.
80. Id. at 378.
81. 38 STAT. 2039 (1914) ; 4 FED. REG. 3821 (1939) ; cf. 2 BRiYEL, INTERNATIONAL
STRAITS 104-08 (1947) (unilateral Danish and Swedish neutrality rules regulating the
Danish Straits).
82. FENwicx, INTERNATIONAL LAW 401 (3d ed. 1948); PADnL1ORD, THE PANAMA
CANAL IN P4AC5 AND WAR 130-31, 181 (1943). But cf. 2 BRizi., INrFRNATIONAL
STRAITs 62-71 (1947) (the laying of mines by neutral Denmark to close the Danish
Straits to belligerent warships during World War I).
83. But see Protocol of an Agreement Relating to Neutrality, Oct. 10, 1914, 38
STAT. 2042, T.S. No. 597, reaffirmed Aug. 25, 1939, 54 STAT. 1811, E.A.S. No. 160.
See generally 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST oP INTERNATIONAL LAW 772-814 (1941).
84. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 204-05.
85. Constantinople Convention arts. I, IV, XI.
86. Cf. Montreux Convention arts. XX, XXI.
87. For general discussion of user rights under treaty law, see note 9 supra; un-
der customary international law, see note 10 supra.
88. See text at notes 91, 92 infra.
89. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III; see text at notes 133-38 infra.
90. See Knapp, The Real Status of the Panama Canal as Regards Neutralization,
4 Am. J. INT'L L. 314, 321 (1910). But see Kennedy, Neutralization and Equal Terms,
7 Ami. J. INTL' L. 27, 35-36 (1913).
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The negative implication of article 380 of the Treaty of Versailles,
that vessels of nations at war with the riparian sovereign need not be
granted passage, accurately reflects the practice in all international canals.
During the first world war the United States issued orders denying pas-
sage through the Panama Canal to enemy ships,91 and permanent regula-
tions have continued the same proscription.9 2 Although it has been said
that in World War I the British allowed passage through the Suez Canal
for German ships,93 none dared attempt entry during World War 11.94
The recent restrictions imposed by Egypt on Israeli shipping, 95 in viola-
tion of the Constantinople Convention,9 6 provide further evidence that,
regardless of treaty commitment, whenever one country is in control of an
inter-oceanic canal it will bar passage to all ships which in its view
present a serious military threat to it.
Insistence that the territorial sovereign permit the vessels of a nation
with which it is at war to pass freely through its canal is unrealistic. The
presence of such ships endangers not only the canal, which would be a
significant target for an enemy, but also the territory of the sovereign.
Furthermore, permitting an enemy to benefit from use of a vital water
route involves an unknown concept of the rules of war. Even the Treaty
of Versailles, which was imposed on a defeated country, recognized the
futility of requiring the Kiel Canal to be opened to nations at war with
Germany. Therefore, the First London Conference's proposal,9 7 which
would continue the Constantinople Convention guarantee of free passage
to all ships at all times, seems unworkable unless coupled with permission
to exclude vessels of Egypt's enemies during time of war.
Though the riparian state be at war, neutral ships, both merchant
vessels and warships, have a general right of passage similar to that avail-
able when the riparian power is at peace.98 Even when a neutral vessel
is being used to aid a declared enemy of the territorial power, treaties
91. 40 STAT. 1667 (1917).
92. 35 C.F.R. § 4.176 (1949); cf. 2 Bai EL, INTERNATIONAL SaAITS 108 (1947)
(absence of Danish or Swedish guarantees for passage through the Danish Straits
when either is belligerent).
93. LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON BLOCKADES, THE UNITED NATIONS AND THE EGYP-
TIAN BLOCKADE OF THE SUEZ CANAL 10 (1953).
94. Id. at 11; cf. 2 BRiIEL, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 174 (1947) (allied control of
the Straits of Gibraltar during wartime) ; Baxter, supra note 68, at 203 (mining of
the Danish Straits and their approaches during World War II).
95. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE ON BLOCKADES, op. cit. supra note 93, at 6-7; Dinitz,
The Legal Aspects of the Egyptian Blockade of the Siez Canal, 45 Gao. L.J. 169
(1957) ; The Security Coumcil and the Sues Canal, 1 INTL & ComP. L.Q. 85 (1952).
For citation to most relevant documents, see Baxter, supra note 68, at 187 n.2. In late
1954 world opinion was particularly aroused when the Israeli freighter, Bat Galim, flying
an Israeli flag and manned by an Israeli crew, was siezed by Egypt off the southern
terminus of the Suez Canal. See Dinitz, supra. at 198; Selak, The Suez Canal Base
Agreement of 1954, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 487, 501-02 (1955).
96. Constantinople Convention arts. I, IV, XI. See, e.g., Dinitz, supra note 95,
at 175-81; N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1956, p. 6, cols. 4-6. But see, e.g., The Suez Canal,
Egyptian Embassy Press Release, Aug. 10, 1956, p. 14.
97. See note 35 supra.
98. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 205-08.
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governing the Suez,9 9 Panama '00 and Kiel 101 canals apparently guarantee
free passage. 0 2 During the two world wars, the Constantinople Conven-
tion was formally satisfied by inspecting neutral vessels while in the
canal zone and postponing confiscation of those aiding the enemy until the
ships were beyond the three-mile limit.4 w However, since 1948 Egypt
has searched neutral ships going through the Suez Canal and, in viola-
tion -0 4 of the Constantinople Convention, 0 5 has seized "contraband" 106
going to or coming from Israel. As long as the littoral sovereign is at war,
this practice seems fair even if carried on within the canal zone. 07  Al-
though the neutral ship presents no immediate danger to other ships in
transit or to the security of the territorial power, since its cargo is even-
tually to be utilized in support of belligerent activities aimed at the latter
it may properly be confiscated.
Right of Passage When the Riparian Power Is in Imminent
Danger of Attack
For a riparian power legitimately to exclude ships from the canal
under the principles outlined above, a state of war must exist. Where a
state of belligerency does clearly exist, it reflects a fundamental antagonism
sufficient to justify closure. However, the determination of this condi-
tion is often difficult and "peace" may frequently be a most artificial
designation. For example, once Egypt and Israel signed a "permanent" 108
armistice agreement in 1949, their subsequent relationship could not readily
be categorized as either war or peace. Moreover, what rule is to govern
during "police actions" or other limited activity such as the recent Anglo-
French intervention? This difficulty can largely be resolved by realistically
recognizing the right of the riparian power to close the canal to ships bearing
the flag of, or acting in aid of, any nation with whom the riparian power
is currently engaged in open hostilities of a substantial character.
A more difficult situation exists when large-scale fighting is absent
but the littoral sovereign anticipates an immediate outbreak. A new rule 109
99. Constantinople Convention art. I.
100. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III; Hay-Varilla Treaty art. XVIII.
101. Treaty of Versailles art. 380.
102. But cf. Montreux Convention art. V, XX.
103. For a general discussion, see Baxter, supra note 68, at 206-08.
104. See LAwyZRS CommiTTZI ox BLocy-.m s, op. cit. supra note 93, at 12; Din-
itz, supra note 95, at 181.
105. Constantinople Convention arts. IV, XI.
106. For recent Egyptian regulations, see N.Y. Times, Oct. 9, 1956, p. 15, col. 1.
For a decision approving confiscation in 1948 of armored cars from neutral ships, see
The Flying Trader, Prize Court of Alexandria, Egypt, Dec. 2, 1950, [1950] Int'l L.
Rep. 440 (Lauterpacht ed. 1956). In the summer of 1956 the Greek freighter, Panagia,
enroute from one Israeli port to another, was barred from the canal. N.Y. Times,
Oct. 14, 1956, § 1, p. 1, col. 7.
107. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 215.
108. See LAWYERS COMMITTEE oN BLoCcADFS, op. cit. supra note 93, at 14-15;
Dinitz, supra note 95, at 190.
109. If unqualified by article XI, article X of the Constantinople Convention may
be construed to allow Egypt a very broad discretion in taking measures deemed neces-
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is also necessary to govern adequately this penumbra. Perhaps the riparian
power should be allowed to bar transit for ships bearing the flag of, or
acting in aid of, any nation from whom the riparian power is in imminent
danger of a substantial armed attack. 10
In opposition to this proposal, it may be contended that war is not
inevitable, that when ill feelings exist between nations the law should
countenance only such conduct by the parties as is conducive to friendly
relations. Because of its economic and military consequences, canal closure
is certain to increase tension, perhaps to the point of precipitating the
feared attack by the excluded state. Accordingly, closure of the canal,
rather than being a defensive measure for the riparian power, could
inspire active hostilities.
It may nevertheless be considered unfair to require a nation to permit
a canal passing through its territory to be used for the economic and military
advantage of a nation about to attack the territorial sovereign. Aside from
the reasonableness of such a requirement, it seems unrealistic to expect the
sovereign to assist in the build-up of another to its own danger or destruc-
tion. Since enforcement of international law is quite unpredictable, even
when sanctions are available, it would seem particularly unwise to press
here for an ideal rule that is certain to be broken. Significantly, there is
every reason to believe that Egypt will not accept a new Suez Canal con-
vention unless it is given the right to exclude Israel from use of the canal
in some situations short of full-scale hostilities.
Protection from abuse requires a rapid, compulsory adjudication of
whether the measures taken by Egypt in any circumstance are justified. It
would seem that an adequate procedure is available within the present
framework of the United Nations Charter. Article 51 reserves the "in-
herent right of individual . . . self-defense if an armed attack occurs
against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has
taken the measures necessary to maintain international peace and security."
Although under a literal reading of article 51 the reserved right would be
unavailable in the absence of an "armed attack," this qualification will
probably be liberally construed to allow defensive action under an imminent
threat of attack."'1 Therefore, if Egypt deemed closure necessary for pur-
poses of self-defense, such action would initially be consistent with the
United Nations Charter.
But article 51 then requires that "measures taken by Members in the
exercise of this right of self-defense shall be immediately reported to the
Security Council ... " If the Security Council, considering an Egyptian
sary for its self-defense. Abuse is courted by such broad phraseology. A minimal lim-
itation is necessary to prohibit a complete obstruction of the canal to all traffic, no
matter how compelling the circumstances.
110. Cf. Montreux Convention arts. VI, XXI.
111. In 1951, during Security Council debate preceding adoption of the resolution
condemning Egyptian restrictions on Israeli shipping, the situation of an imminent
threat of attack on Egypt, as well as that of actual armed attack, was expressly dis-
tinguished. See U.N. SMUcRITY COUN cIL OFP. Rmc., 6th year, 550th meeting 8, 20
(1951) ; id. 552d meeting 3, 13.
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petition, found that Egypt's enemy posed a "threat to the peace," 112 Egypt
could legitimately continue to bar ships belonging to, or acting in aid of,
the violating nation. The Security Council decision would in fact be a
determination of whether or not Egypt was in imminent danger of attack,
yet would employ a more familiar standard already agreed upon.113 In
effect, then, closure would also act as a sanction for enforcement of the
resolution condemning the nation threatening attack. Of course, even
when Egypt is not the petitioner, under article 41 the Security Council
theoretically could "call upon" Egypt to close the canal as a U.N. sanction
short of the use of force. The imposition of such a burden on Egypt, how-
ever, might be totally unacceptable to that country 114 and hence limit the
probable usefulness of such action as a sanction.
If the Security Council were to reject an Egyptian resolution con-
demning the posture of Egypt's alleged enemy as presenting a "threat to
the peace," Egypt would then be under a duty to open the canal. Indeed,
if closure were continued, the Security Council could find that such action
in itself constituted a "threat to the peace," as in 1951.115 It would seem
that the ultimate obstacle to a peaceful ordering of canal activities lies, as
it did in 1951, in securing adequate pressure for compliance when the
country adversely affected by closure is small and without a ready ally.
Yet the recent Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza strip and positions border-
ing the Straits of Tiran was apparently based on the belief that just such
pressure would be forthcoming." 6  Article 41 would also authorize the
Security Council to order payment of canal tolls to a neutral body, and to
take other economic measures, in order to enforce any resolution against
Egypt." 62 Although exercise of the veto power prevented reaffirmation
in 1954 118b of the 1951 Security Council resolution, and may bar similar
action in the future, it would nevertheless seem wise to continue to act
within the present U. N. structure, for the Security Council is the only
supra-national body authorized to employ such sanctions.
Further Restrictions on the Right of Passage
"Neutralization" Provisions
In addition to proclaiming a general right of free passage through
inter-oceanic canals, treaties outline correlative duties of the signatory
112. Pursuant to U.N. CHARTmR art. 39.
113. Cf. Montreux Convention art. XXI, which provided comparable review by
the Council of the League of Nations and the signatories to the convention of Turkish
activity in the straits under a standard of imminence of war.
114. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 210.
115. U.N. SECURITY COUN IL OFF. REc., 6th year, 558th meeting 2 (1951).
116. It might also be possible, if Egypt were to agree, to utilize U.N. toll collec-
tion as a lever to enforce Egyptian compliance. See text at notes 189-91 infra.
116a. Cf. Text at note 189 infra.
116b. U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL OFF. Rac., 9th year, 664th Meeting 12 (1954).
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nations deemed necessary to protect such rights. Through customary ad-
herence thereto, many such limitations may now be reasonably implied in
the phrase "free and open passage." -17 The proscription of activities
designed to obstruct passage is obvious and basic."'8 In order to reduce
the risk of damage to, or obstruction of, innocent shipping, hostile or
belligerent acts are prohibited within the canal zones, even though not
intended to block traffic."19 Such restrictions have frequently been termed
"neutralization" of the area. 2 0
A mutual agreement to refrain from hostilities can be effective only
when the power controlling the canal is not a belligerent. It would be
unrealistic in wartime to expect a convention provision to deter the enemy
of the territorial sovereign from attacking one of the latter's most strategic
zones in order to protect neutral shipping.' 2 ' Though a signatory to the
Constantinople Convention, Germany did not refrain from bombing the
canal during World War II.122 More recently, Britain and France, even
without a declaration of war, bombed and invaded the Suez Canal zone,
thus violating the Constantinople Convention "neutralization" provisions
despite the alleged Anglo-French purpose of protecting passage through
the canal.n 3 Although the efficacy of any restriction on hostilities must
seriously be questioned in light of the aforementioned events, such a rule
probably has a deterrent force sufficient to justify its retention.
Fortifications
While the Constantinople Convention of 1888 expressly prohibited
Suez Canal fortifications 124 without employing the term "neutralization,"
in contrast the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty purportedly "neutralized" the
117. See Baxter, supra note 68, at 215.
118. Constantinople Convention arts. I, IV; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 2.
119. Constantinople Convention art. IV; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 2;
cf. Montreux Convention art. XIX. When the British seized the Suez Canal in 1882
to prevent its capture or destruction by the revolutionaries, traffic ceased for twenty-
four hours. Lawrence, The Suez Canal in Intenational Law, in MODERN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW 37, 47 (1884). The recent Anglo-French intervention in the Suez Canal
zone, though allegedly designed to protect passage, led to total obstruction for a period
of months.
120. BiusixL, THE LAW o NATIONS 192 (4th ed. 1949); Hains, Neutralization
of the Panama Caizl, 3 Ame. J. INT'L L. 354 (1909) ; Kennedy, supra note 90; Knapp,
supra note 90.
121. See Lawrence, supra note 119, at 56-57.
122. See SCHONFiELD, THE SuEz CANAL IN WORLD AFFAIRS 103-08 (1953); Bax-
ter, supra note 68, at 204.
123. Addresses by Prime Minister Eden and Premier Mollet, Oct. 30, 1956, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 31, 1956, p. 16, cols. 4-7; Statement by Sir Pierson Dixon before the
United Nations Security Council, Oct. 31, 1956, N.Y. Times, Nov. 1, 1956, p. 16, cols.
4-6.
124. Constantinople Convention art. XI; cf. Declaration Between the United
Kingdom and France Respecting Egypt and Morocco, April 8, 1904, art. VII, 1 AM.
J. INT'L L. 6, 8 (Supp. 1907) (prohibition against the erection of "fortifications or
strategic works" on a portion of the Moorish coast bordering the Straits of Gibral-
tar), discussed in 2 BROEL, INTERNATIONAL STRAITS 152-56 (1947).
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Panama Canal '2 5 without mentioning fortifications. 126 During completion
of the Panama Canal a major controversy 17 raged over whether the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty, by expressly "neutralizing" the canal, though remain-
ing silent on fortifications, nevertheless barred the United States from
fortifying the Panama Canal Zone. The question has been largely academic,
however, because the Canal Zone was fortified with the acquiescence of the
British Foreign Office 1 28 and has remained fortified ever since without
challenge from other users. 2 9 .
Restraining the territorial sovereign from fortifying the canal area
would in fact be a disservice to user countries at peace with the territorial
sovereign. The presence of fortifications could deter an enemy attack that
may otherwise be aimed at the artery. Furthermore, their purpose would
be wholly defensive, preserving free passage for ships of neutrals, the littoral
sovereign and its allies. Those opposed to fortifications contend that they
offer an incentive for attack on the canal that otherwise would not exist.'3 0
This argument assumes that in the absence of fortifications an enemy of
the territorial sovereign would refrain from attempting to seize, damage
or obstruct a waterway of immense strategic value to the controlling power.
Such a view seems totally unrealistic, especially in light of past practices
of those bound by treaty to refrain from hostilities in such areas.'
3 '
Limitations on Warship Activity
Treaties have also regulated the passage of belligerent warships 132 to
prevent movements which could be preparatory to violation of the general
proscriptions outlined above. For example, provisions in both the Con-
stantinople Convention and the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty require belligerent
warships to complete transit in twenty-four hours,1' s with the least possible
125. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty preamble, art. III. See also Hay-Varilla Treaty
art. XVIII (agreement between the United States and Panama that the canal and its
entrances would be "neutral in perpetuity" and opened in conformity to stipulations
of the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty); cf. Treaty Between Argentine Republic and Chile,
Establishing the Neutrality of Straits of Magellan, July 23, 1881, art. V, 3 Am. J.
IN L L. 121, 122 (Supp. 1909) (attempt to "insure . . . neutrality" by prohibiting
fortifications).
126. Fortifications were expressly prohibited in the Treaty Between the United
States of America and Her Britannic Majesty (Clayton-Bulwer Treaty), April 19,
1850, art. I, 9 STAT. 995, T.S. No. 122. This treaty was expressly superseded by the
Hay-Pauncefote Treaty pursuant to article I thereof.
127. See, e.g., OPP4NMIM, THn PANAMA CANAL CoN LIcTr 22 (1913); Hains,
.supra note 120; Olney, Fortification of the Panama Canal, 5 Am. J. INT'L L. 298
(1911).
128. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIMsT OP IN TRNATIONAL LAw 791 (1941). See gener-
ally id. at 791-97.
129. Since the canal has always been fortified, and since all nations other than
Great Britain, Panama and the United States have obtained user rights solely through
the establishment of custom, see notes 9, 10 supra, such user nations could not justifi-
ably challenge such fortifications.
130. See Kennedy, The Canal Fortifications and the Treaty, 5 Am. J. INT'L L.
620, 622-25 (1911).
131. See text at notes 122, 123 supra.
132. For the problem of classifying vessels, see note 74 supra.
133. Constantinople Convention art. IV; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 5.
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delay 134 and without unnecessary stops to revictual,135 to take on stores, 136
or to embark or disembark troops or war materiel. 3' Moreover, to prevent
friction between belligerent warships from damaging the canal facilities
or otherwise obstructing passage for other ships, "an interval of twenty-
four hours shall always elapse between the sailing of a belligerent
ship from one of the ports of access and the departure of a ship belonging
to the hostile power." 1-3 Finally, with respect to the Suez Canal, bel-
ligerents are not accorded the treaty privilege of stationing two warships
in the access ports of Port Said and Suez.' 39 These regulations seem fair
and, with a few modernizations, 1 40 should be made part of any new
convention.
In addition to treaty provisions regarding belligerent warships, more
restrictive regulations have been unilaterally issued by the canal oper-
ators.1 4 1  Most of these regulations are probably justified as reasonable
adaptations of more generalized treaty provisions to current conditions,
but to avoid dispute over the treaty's scope those regulations deemed
worthwhile should be expressly incorporated into the new Suez con-
vention. For example, Panama Canal regulations deny passage unless
written assurance of compliance with canal regulations is received by the
canal authorities from the captain of a belligerent warship applying for
entry.'4 Furthermore, a very strict limit has been unilaterally placed
on fuel and lubricant intake,' 43 on use of repair facilities and docks,1' on
use of radio installations on belligerent vessels, 145 on activity of belligerent
aircraft ' 4 6 and on the number of warships of any one nation and its allies,
belligerent or not, that may be in the canal system at any one time. 4 7  In
addition, all ships desiring passage must submit to many lesser regula-
tions designed to protect all shipping from unintentional obstruction, delay
or other inconvenience.
1 48
134. Constantinople Convention art. IV; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 3;
cf. Montreux Convention art. XVI.
135. Constantinople Convention art. IV; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 3.
136. Ibid.
137. Constantinople Convention art. V; Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 4.
138. Constantinople Convention art. IV; see Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 5.
139. Constantinople Convention art. VII.
140. See, e.g., unilateral regulations cited at notes 142-48 infra.
141. Congress has empowered the President to promulgate regulations governing
the Panama Canal. C.Z. CODE tit. 2, § 9 (1934).
142. 35 C.F.R. § 4.164 (1949).
143. Id. §§ 4.166-68.
144. Id. § 4.172.
145. Id. § 4.173.
146. Id. § 4.174; cf. Montreux Convention art. IV.
147. There shall be no more than "three in either terminal port and its adjacent
terminal waters, or than three in transit through the Canal; nor shall the total number
of such vessels, at any one time, exceed six in all the territorial waters of the Canal
Zone . . . ." 35 C.F.R. § 4.171 (1949). The section title refers only to belligerent ves-
sels, but the text is not similarly qualified.
148. See id. §§ 4.1-.160. See also UNIVERSAL SUEZ MARITIME CANAL COMPANY,
RULES ov NAVIGATION (1953).
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Equal Treatment
All international treaties governing inter-oceanic canals rightly guar-
antee equal access to ships of all nations. 149 Nevertheless, a state may
attempt to rationalize apparently discriminatory behavior by unilateral in-
terpretation and application of other treaty provisions. For example,
Egypt has interpreted the Constantinople Convention as allowing her the
right to bar passage to enemy ships and those carrying cargo which may
aid her enemy.' 50  She has further determined that Israel fits the category
of enemy,'" in spite of an existing armistice agreement.152 The danger
of discrimination from this source is due not only to ambiguous and per-
haps unrealistic treaty clauses, but also to the failure of the treaty to
provide for compulsory adjudication by an impartial tribunal, with assured
enforcement of resultant decisions.
Another form of discrimination exists in the case of the Panama Canal.
Although the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty's regulation of belligerent warship
activities creates no specific exception for ships of the United States, this
country has by executive order exempted its warships from such restric-
tions.1' Such an exemption is justified if it is conceded that the treaty
does not attempt to regulate belligerent activities of the United States, 154
an argument similar to that made with regard to the right of the United
States to exclude ships belonging to its enemies. 15 5 This problem, how-
ever, like that of fortifications,156 is probably academic since the British
early stated that they "do not question its [United States'] title to exercise
belligerent rights for its protection." 157
149. "The Suez Maritime Canal shall always be free and open, in time of war as
in time of peace, to every vessel of commerce or of war without distinction of flag."
Constantinople Convention art. I. See also id. art. XII. "The [Panama] canal shall be
free and open to the vessels of commerce and of war of all nations observing these
Rules, on terms of entire equality, so that there shall be no discrimination against any
such nation, or its citizens or subiects, in respect of the conditions or charges of traffic
or otherwise." Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 1; see Versailles Treaty arts. 380,
381; ef. Barcelona Statute on Freedom of Transit, April 20, 1921, arts. II, III,
7 L.N.T.S. 27 (hereinafter cited as Barcelona Statute); Montreux Convention arts.
II, IV, X. But cf. id. preamble, arts. XI, XII, XVIII (special protection afforded
Black Sea powers through regulation of the Turkish Straits). A German court has
held that the Versailles Treaty, in providing for equal use of the Kiel Canal, did not
thereby require Germany to provide equal access to its courts to governments seeking
redress for damage to vessels caused by negligent acts of canal pilots employed by the
German government. The Cumene, Reichsgericht, Oct. 13, 1925, [1925-1926] ANN.
DiG. PUB. INT'L L. CAs. 128 (McNair & Lauterpacht eds. 1929).
150. See, e.g., The Suez Canal, Egyptian Embassy Press Release, Aug. 10, 1956, p.14.
151. Ibid.
152. Egyptian-Israeli General Armistice Agreement, Feb. 24, 1949, 42 L.N.T.S.
251.
153. 35 C.F.R. §§ 4.64-.74 (1949).
154. But see OPPENHEIM, TnE PANAMA CANAL CONFLICT 18 (1913), wherein the
author contends that "neutralization" of the canal necessarily means that the United
States is equally bound to obey the article III provisions governing belligerent activi-
ties and movements of belligerent warships.
155. See text at notes 88-90 supra.
156. See text at note 128 supra.
157. 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 797 (1941).
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However, there is at least one act of Congress now in effect which
clearly seems to violate the non-discrimination clause of the Hay-Pauncefote
Treaty. This is a statute which expressly bars passage through the
Panama Canal to ships owned, chartered, operated or controlled by violators
of the federal anti-trust laws.1 8 Apparently an attempt to bolster en-
forcement of the anti-trust laws against foreign concerns, this statute is
nevertheless inconsistent with both the letter of the treaty 159 and the
concept of the canal as an international waterway. To forestall the pos-
sibility that international canals will be utilized to enforce unrelated national
legislation, the canal convention should expressly prohibit the application
of such laws.
Manipulation of canal tolls can be a particularly effective means of
discrimination, quite separate from outright obstruction of access or
"covert" harassment during passage. The Hay-Pauncefote Treaty ex-
pressly deals with this problem by requiring non-discriminatory charges.10
A general guarantee of equal treatment in the Constantinople Convention
serves the same purpose.' 6 ' Typical of the sort of abuse that may arise
are several incidents involving the Panama Canal. Originally, the Panama
Canal Act 16 2 made the canal toll-free to all United States ships engaged
in United States coastal trade. The British immediately protested, and
Congress subsequently repealed the contested provision.'6 Furthermore,
in compliance with treaties with Panama16 4 and Colombia,1' current
legislation' 66 exempts vessels of the Republics of Panama and Colombia
158. 37 STAT. 567 (1912), 15 U.S.C. § 31 (1952).
159. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 1.
160. Ibid.; cf. Barcelona Statute art. III; Montreux Convention annex I. Oppen-
heim also thought the words "just and equitable" required that "every vessel which
uses the Canal shall bear a proportionate part of such cost." OPPNH]Fim, TH PAN-
AMA CANAL CONFLiCT 30 (1913).
161. Constantinople Convention arts. I, XII.
162. Act of Aug. 24, 1912, c. 390, § 5, 37 STAT. 562.
163. Act of June 15, 1914, c. 106, § 1, 38 STAT. 385. See The Repeal of the Pro-
vision of the Panama Canal Act Exempting American Coast'wise Vessels From the
Payment of Tolls, 8 Am. J. INT'L L. 592 (1914). For much of the debates, see 1912
FORirN RnL. U.S. 467-89 (1919); 1913 FOREIGN RZL. U.S. 540-49 (1920). President
Taft contended that the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty merely granted to foreign nations
the use of the canal under a conditional most-favored-nation clause. Memorandum
from the President to Congress, 1912 FoRSIGN REL. U.S. 475, 476 (1919). Contra,
OPPENHEIm, THE PANAMA CANAL CONFLICT 12 (1913): "Since she did not own the
Canal territory and had not made the Canal at the time when she agreed with Great
Britain upon the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty, she ought not to maintain that she granted
to foreign nations the privilege of using her Canal under a conditional most-favored-
nation clause . . ."; Latan6, The Panama Canal Act and the British Protest, 7 Am. J.
INT'L L. 17 (1913); Wambaugh, Exemption From Panama Tolls, 7 Am. J. INTIL L.
233 (1913). Repeal was strongly urged by President Wilson in an address delivered
at a joint session of the two Houses of Congress, March 5, 1914, 1914 FOIGN REL. U.
S. 317 (1922), and by Senator Root, RooT, ADDssxsS ON INTERNATIONAL SumcITS
207-312 (1916). See generally 2 HAcKWORTH, DIGEST OF TaITERNATIONAL LAW 772-80
(1941).
164. Hay-Varilla Treaty art. XIX.
165. Treaty for the Settlement of Differences Arising Out of Events Which Took
Place on the Isthmus of Panama in November, 1903, April 6, 1914, 42 STAT. 2122,
T.S. No. 661.
166. C.Z. CODE tit. 2, §412 (Supp. 1943).
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from payment of Panama Canal tolls. The British objected to this also,167
but later acquiesced 168 when the United States explained that such a
concession was necessary to secure full rights over the canal zone and
assured Great Britain that such an extraordinary measure would not be
utilized in the future. 69 Lacking a contrary provision in the governing
treaty, the operating power may attempt to utilize its control over canal
tolls either in promoting its national commercial interests or as a lever
in bargaining with other nations. To prevent abuses arising from unilateral
interpretation of the concept of equal treatment, those negotiating the new
convention should deal with the aforementioned questionable activities and
embody decisions as to each in the agreement.
II. SOVEREIGNTY OF THE TERRITORIAL POWER
It has been suggested that the world community has acquired user
rights through the Suez Canal by long usage under a multilateral con-
vention.170 Moreover, it may be contended that the world economy has
been patterned largely in reliance on the Suez Canal as a free and open
channel operated by an organization of international character.171 If this
view is accepted, the original and apparently unchanged desire of the user
nations to have the canal operated by an international body does not
contravene the second agreed principle-respect for the sovereignty of
Egypt-even though this principle be construed to mean that Egypt's
sovereignty should be left unimpaired.
In opposition, Egypt would point out that the canal was originally
carved from, and currently passes through, Egyptian soil; that the rights
enjoyed by users were originally obtained through Egyptian consent and
hence should be strictly construed. Furthermore, there is no precedent
in international law requiring the sovereign to relinquish its right to control
operation in favor of some international body. The Universal Suez Canal
Company, though possessing some international characteristics, received
its authority to operate the canal solely through concessions from the
Khedive. In addition, the other two canals of major international sig-
nificance have always been operated by subsidiary governmental organs
of the riparian power. Therefore, the Suez Canal may be said to be
dedicated to the world community only with respect to a right of free and
equal transit, yet under the limitations customarily imposed by all powers
167. The original clause which evoked the protest had first been inserted in the
abortive 1909 treaty with Colombia. See 2 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw 775 (1941).
168. Id. at 778-79.
169. Id. at 775-78.
170. See Baxter, Passage of Ships Through International Waterways in Time
of War, 31 BRIT. Y.B. INT'L L. 187 (1956).
171. While rejecting Western arguments that the Constantinople Convention or
the unique status of the company or the canal prohibited cancellation of the canal con-
cession, one author has at least recognized that such reliance should be accorded seri-
ous consideration. Note, Nationalization of the Suez Canal Company, 70 HARv. L.
Rlv. 480, 482-85 (1957).
1957]
734 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
controlling similar international waterways. The existing customary right
to free and equal passage suggests that international operation is not neces-
sary to secure this right for the users.
Recognizing that the Security Council expressly rejected a require-
ment of international operation, and conceding that prior agreement does
not infringe on the exercise of Egyptian sovereignty to control canal
operation, the second principle still need not exclude the possibility of
international operation. It is not inconsistent with "respect" for Egyptian
sovereignty for that nation to agree to the creation of an international
body to operate the canal. However, since this concept of "respect" merely
involves recognition of Egypt as the territorial sovereign having interests
that must be considered, the second principle would be virtually super-
fluous. It seems obvious that in negotiating with a nation now in possession
of the waterway, its sovereignty will be accorded high respect.
Regardless of the advantages of international operation to most of the
world, it appears certain that Egypt will continue to reject such a proposal.
In a recent memorandum, Egypt has declared that the canal will be oper-
ated by an Egyptian Suez Canal Authority. 71  Accepting this view as the
probable working premise, the users may do better to concentrate on in-
corporating in the convention adequate workable controls over Egyptian
operation.172 With the Anglo-French-Israeli invasion fresh in the minds
of all Egyptians, the users may find it very difficult to secure any restraints
on Egyptian operation.
Aside from the question of what body is to be charged with canal
operation, it seems clear that the second principle was intended to assure
Egypt of the right to prescribe health and sanitation requirements, rules
to protect Egyptian customs and immigration laws, and the application of
its criminal laws. As to these matters, it seems certain Egypt will be al-
lowed to exercise its sovereignty. Such rights have been reserved to the
territorial power under present treaties otherwise "internationalizing" inter-
oceanic canals. The Constantinople Convention reserved "the rights of
Turkey as the territorial power" 173 and provided that the treaty stipula-
tions should not "interfere with the sanitary measures in force in Egypt." 174
In the Hay-Pauncefote Treaty the British relinquished any interest in
operating the prospective Panama Canal by allowing the United States
the "exclusive rights of providing for the regulation and management of the
canal," 175 but under the guarantee that "conditions" of traffic be just and
equitable as well as non-discriminatory against any nation.'7 6 Article 381
of the Versailles Treaty presents a model for pertinent international legis-
lation. It provided, with respect to the Kiel Canal:
171a. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, col. 6.
172. See text at notes 188-91 infra.
173. Constantinople Convention art. XII. Egypt was then under the suzerainty
of Turkey, the actual convention signatory.
174. Id. art. XV.
175. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. IT.
176. Id. art. III, § 1.
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"No impediment shall be placed on the movement of persons
or vessels other than those arising out of police, customs, sanitary,
emigration or immigration regulations, and those relating to the import
and export of prohibited goods and . . . such regulations must be
reasonable and uniform and must not unnecessarily impede traffic."
At present, moreover, the United States Government promulgates a
detailed set of such regulations for the Panama Canal Zone.177 These
incidental controls have long been tolerated because they are frequently
of mutual benefit, and the resultant traffic restrictions are usually slight.
An additional "sovereign" right normally retained by the local power
is that of "territorial" judicial jurisdiction over the canal waters, as well as
over resident personnel and conduct on adjacent land. Local courts exercise
jurisdiction over collisions occurring in canal zone waters, 7 8 and the
principle of innocent passage has failed to prevent the civil arrest of vessels
when within such waters.17 9 Violation of a canal regulation is a criminal
offense triable in local courts,'80 while criminal conduct aboard ship should
probably be governed by the "peace of the port" doctrine. The convention
should explicitly reserve to Egypt these and other "sovereign rights,"
but any right of civil arrest for prior causes of ships, passengers or crews
making a through trip should be withdrawn, since peacetime user rights
should exist independently of any disputes that are unrelated to the canal
itself.' 8 '
III. INSULATION OF CANAL OPERATION FROm NATIONAL POLITICS
The third principle, requiring that operation of the canal be insulated
from national politics, has been described as the key concession obtained
from the Egyptians during the negotiations at the United Nations.8s That
this is a real concession, however, seems doubtful. The first principle,
in ensuring free and open passage without discrimination, appears to grant
the same guarantee as the third. Although the language of the third prin-
ciple can be construed as requiring international operation of the canal, it is
unlikely that such meaning was intended, inasmuch as Egypt had adamantly
continued to resist such a proposal '-8 and a separate provision for inter-
national operation was expressly rejected by the Security Council when the
six principles were adopted. 184
177. See, e.g., 35 C.F.R. §§ 6.1-.11, 9.1-.18, 10.1-.59, 24.1-.104, 30.1-.5 (1949).
178. Kiel Canal Collision Case, German (British Zone) Supreme Court, [1950]
Int'l L. Rep. 133 (Lauterpacht ed. 1956).
179. The "David," Am. & Panamanian Gen. Cl. Arb. 765, 812 (1934).
180. C.Z. CoDE tit. 2, § 413 (Supp. 1943).
181. See Borchard, The United States-Panana Claims Arbitration, 29 Am. J.
INT'L L. 99, 104-05 (1935).
182. See, e.g., Secretary of State Dulles' News Conference, Oct. 16, 1956, 35
DiT' STAT4 BULL. 655 (1956).
183. See, e.g., remarks by Foreign Minister Mahmoud Fawzi, Nov. 25, 1956, N.Y.
Times, Nov. 26, 1956, p. 6, col. 3.
184. See text at notes 47, 48 supra
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It seems clear that the clause was intended to provide some device,
short of the use of force, international operation of the canal '15 or removal
of Egyptian sovereignty over the canal zone,18 6 for preventing or correcting
unreasonable unilateral interpretations of whatever new convention may
be signed, even assuming Egyptian operation. Any machinery set up for
this purpose should be concerned not only with the "operation" of the canal
but should extend to all activities within the canal zone. The necessity
for such broad coverage is demonstrated by the fact that discriminatory
treatment of Israeli ships and goods occurred before as well as after Egypt
assumed operation of the canal from the nationalized Universal Suez Canal
Company.'
8 7
At the core of a workable control device is frequent review of Egyptian
operation by an impartial, professional body, perhaps within the United
Nations Secretariat, whose decisions would be subject to a limited judicial
review by the International Court of Justice. 88 This commission, staffed
with experts, could be authorized to examine periodically and pass upon
proposed budgets, toll schedules, prospective improvement programs,
financial reports and the efficacy of operations and development. All
disputes arising under the new convention concerning matters other than
those assigned to the commission could be made subject to compulsory
arbitration by an impartial tribunal, with review by the International
Court.
Once a final decision has been reached, sanctions must be available to
enforce compliance, or little progress will have been made. Therefore,
upon presentation of proof of Egyptian non-compliance, the International
Court could be empowered to order all tolls paid to the U.N. commission.8 9
Any annuity that might have been payable to Egypt could then be with-
185. For a variety of international administrative devices, see SAYRE, EXPERIMENTS
IN INTERNATIONAL ADMINISTRATION (1919); Kunz, Experience and Techniques in
International Adminiistration, 31 IowA L. REv. 40 (1945). There has also been a pro-
posal for an International Straits Commission under the authority and direction of
the United Nations General Assembly for the purpose of controlling the administration
of all canals and straits currently of strategic importance. Open letter from Mrs.
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chairman, Board of Governors, American Association for
the United Nations, Sept. 26, 1956.
186. Cf. Lawrence, The Suez Canal in International Law, in MODERN INTRMNA-
TIONAL LAW 37, 62-64 (1884) (proposal for the creation of an "Oriental Belgium of
minute proportions" for the same area). Lord Granville at one time proposed neutral-
ization of all Egypt. Id. at 62.
187. Similarly, the discriminatory activities were carried on before as well as after
the 1954 withdrawal of British occupation troops.
188. Other means short of international operation may be available to take canal
operation out of the hands of the Egyptian government. For example, a private organ-
ization might be commissioned by Egypt to manage the canal on a fixed-fee basis.
However, such an organization would still be responsible to Egypt, and no ultimate
impartial supervision would be provided; otherwise, there would for this purpose be
no difference from U.N. operation.
189. Cf. the four-power proposal for interim operation of the Suez Canal, which
would require payment of all tolls to the International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, some other international agency or a private bank, with 50% of the tolls
to be paid to Egypt and 50% reserved for expense of canal clearance and other related
costs. N.Y. Times, Feb. 20, 1957. p. 10, col. 2. This interim plan has, however, been
rejected by President Nasser. N.Y. Times, March 10, 1957, § 1, p. 1, col. 8.
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held until a United Nations inspection team reports compliance.190 In the
interim, to ensure that all funds paid to Egypt are properly used in the
administration of canal operations and development, additional on-the-spot
supervision may also be provided. United Nations seizure of canal
facilities might be reserved as an ultimate sanction to be employed by the
Secretary General when all other means have been exhausted. With a
procedure supported by sanctions as described, Western fears that Egypt
is not competent to operate the canal efficiently, progressively and fairly
in the interest of the users could be largely allayed.
Egypt, on the other hand, may reject such a proposal. 191 If this does
happen, the users' ensuing action would depend upon their willingness
to place unfettered control in Egypt's hands, relying on promises alone,
rather than resorting to sterner measures including war to ensure their
continued use of this vital waterway.
IV-V. ASSESSMENT AND DISBURSEMENT OF CANAL TOLLS
Because of the relationship between tolls and their allotment for
development purposes, the fourth and fifth principles will be discussed
jointly. Egypt might have insisted that determination of the manner in
which charges will be fixed and the purposes for which the proceeds will
be used is a sovereign right reserved to herself. The importance of tolls
to Egypt and the users, however, renders agreement on the matter a
necessary ingredient in a lasting convention. Egypt's willingness to confer
on tbis issue provided at least one hopeful sign for an amicable settlement
of the entire dispute.
Although there are alternate routes available to canal users, including
those by air and land, the cost differential between such routes and a direct
water route essentially renders all existing inter-oceanic canals natural
monopolies. To prevent the exercise of monopoly power in fixing rates
geared to maximize profit without regard to the public need for service,
it is in the interest of the users that canal rates be regulated much the
same as are rates charged by "public utilities" in the United States. 9 2
If left uncontrolled, the operating power may disregard the users' needs
and charge the highest price the traffic will bear. Since the Suez and
Panama canals have so greatly shortened major water routes,' users of
these canals will submit to much abuse before resorting to alternate
routes.
94
190. Cf. Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Oct. 26, 1956, art.
XII, 35 DmWT STAT4 Buu.. 824 (1956).
191. Egypt may feel that acceptance would imply an admission of incompetence
and unfairness in its administration of the canal. See note 189 supra.
192. Cf. Wambaugh, supra note 163, at 236-38.
193. The Suez Canal route is approximately 4,700 miles, 12-18 days, shorter than
the route around the Cape of Good Hope. U.S. News & World Report, Sept. 28, 1956,
p. 35.
194. See Lawrence, supra note 186, at 67. In spite of the high canal tolls which
were being charged before the recent stoppage, the diversion of ships from the Suez
Canal around Africa or through the Panama Canal added 15% to liner freight rates.
N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1956, p. 11, col. 1.
19571
738 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 105
Implicit in toll regulation is the necessity for agreement on the service
to be rendered in exchange for the tolls. A major contention of the
users has been that Egypt will not provide fully adequate canal service. 195
Justified or not, such a concern on the part of the canal users is appropriate,
for the worth of all other legal guarantees will ultimately be directly pro-
portionate to the commercial or military value of the canal to those using it.
Hence, all present or prospective users will seek the swiftest, safest transit
for even their largest vessels at lowest rates. Assuming no discrimination
among users, the profit motive of the operating instrumentality will neces-
sarily conflict with that of each user.
As drafted, however, it is uncertain whether the words "manner of
fixing tolls" contained in the fourth principle relate only to the basis of
allocating tolls to the shippers, e.g., gross tonnage, cargo value, etc., or also
include agreement on the amount of the toll or, at least, the factors to be
considered in computing the charge. This ambiguity may lessen the value
of the parties' original agreement to the fourth principle if Egypt insists
on the narrower interpretation. Egypt may demand that rates be set
unilaterally, as the prerogative of the riparian sovereign, especially since the
Universal Suez Canal Company heretofore had unrestricted power to set
non-discriminatory tolls. The user nations, no doubt aware of the potential
danger in such concentration of power, will probably construe the fourth
principle as including negotiations to set the amount of the toll and the
type of service to be rendered. Regardless of Egypt's interpretation, it
seems certain that the users will seek negotiation in terms of the broader
interpretation.
In partial recognition of the importance of toll and service regulation,
the United States and Great Britain, with respect to the Panama Canal,
have agreed that "conditions and charges of traffic shall be just and
equitable." 196 The Constantinople Convention contained no similar refer-
ence to tolls and conditions of operation, although the guarantee of free
access '17 implies, at least, that tolls not be prohibitive. The Versailles
Treaty alone specifically limited tolls to those necessary for expenses.
19 8
A first step in fixing "reasonable" or "just and equitable" tolls would
be to relate individual charges to the economic or military value which pas-
sage of the particular vessel would secure to the user. Operators have
achieved a rough relationship for commercial vessels by setting the charge
according to the size of the pay-load area, i.e., in proportion to the cargo
space or passenger quarters. 199 Warship rates are geared to displace-
ment. 00 The manner of allocating the toll to each vessel seems equitable
195. See, e.g., statement by Secretary of State Dulles at 2d Plenary Session,
First London Conference, Aug. 16, 1956, THI SUlz CANAL PROBLtm 76.
196. Hay-Pauncefote Treaty art. III, § 1.
197. Constantinople Convention art. I.
198. Versailles Treaty arts. 382, 384; cf., Montreux Convention art. II, annex I.
199. E.g., 35 C.F.R. §§ 27.1(a), (b) (Supp. 1955). A cheaper rate is charged "on
vessels in ballast without passengers or cargo." Id. § 27.1 (b).
200. E.g., id. § 27.1 (c).
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if it bears a reasonable relationship to the service that is rendered. By this
standard, use of the aforementioned allocation bases seems satisfactory.
A second major step is to determine a "reasonable" level for the rate
schedules. Probably none would seriously doubt that revenues must at
least meet current expenses; the problem, however, concerns the make-up
of the various expense items. Clearly all parties would consent to payment
of necessary costs of operation and maintenance, but users may differ with
the operator over the quantity and quality of the service required. In
addition to meeting cost of maintenance and operation, in the case of the
Panama Canal, tolls are used to support the Canal Zone government,
201
which is only incidentally concerned with operation and maintenance of the
canal but which exercises a necessary supporting function. The Panama
Canal Company also uses tolls to pay for interest on the initial investment 
2 02
and for the annuities due the Republic of Panama as part payment for
the original concession.203 An interesting question is raised by the fact
that the United States has subsequently increased the annuity payments.2 04
In so doing, the United States has unilaterally increased expenditures
and hence increased, or prevented a decrease in, the tolls, although this
expense fails to reflect additional service to users. While this action may
appear reasonable in view of changes in currency valuation, it reveals an
area of potential abuse where adequate international controls are needed.
As previously suggested,20 5 periodic review by a United Nations agency
may provide one of the necessary institutional devices to control abuse of
this character.
Once agreement is reached on expenses, basic policy differences may
nevertheless remain regarding an allowance for profits. Most agree that
reserves should be established from current income to provide for im-
provements 20 6 and for meeting fixed costs in bad years,2 0 7 but views differ
on the extent to which improvement should be undertaken.2 08 This problem
201. See report for fiscal year ending June 30, 1956, N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1956,
§ 5, p. 13, col. 5.
202. Ibid. Approved as "reasonable" in Wambaugh, .rupra note 163, at 237.
203. See N.Y. Times, Nov. 11, 1956, § 5, p. 13, col. 5.
204. The annuity was raised from an original $250,000, Hay-Varilla Treaty art.
XIV, to the equivalent of 430,000 balboas, beginning with 1934, General Treaty Between
the United States and Panama, March 2, 1936, art. VII, 53 STAT. 1818, T.S. No. 945,
and increased to the equivalent of 1,930,000 balboas in 1955, Treaty of Mutual Under-
standing and Cooperation, Jan. 25, 1955, art. I, 6 U.S. TpAaizs & OvxMR INVL
AGmAMNTs 2273, T.I.A.S. No. 3297. See Fenwick, The Treaty of 1955 Between the
United States and Panama, 49 Am. J. INT'L L. 543, 544 (1955). Although the treaties
specify balboa equivalent, payment has been made in an equal number of dollars. See,
e.g., Supplemental Appropriation Act, 1956, c. 10, 69 STAT. 464 (1955).
205. See text at notes 188-91 supra.
206. Improvement allotments were included within the revised Indian plan, N.Y.
Times, Oct. 17, 1956, p. 2, cols. 4-5, and the eighteen-nation proposal, see note 35
supra. Western experts predict a rapid decline in the usefulness of the canal unless
vast improvements are soon undertaken. N.Y. Times, Oct. 14, 1956, § 1, p. 23, col. 1.
207. N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1956, p. 2, cols. 3-5. See Wambaugh, supra note 163.
208. For example, if no limits were placed on surplus profits, improvements would
be undertaken only to the point of diminishing return. On the other hand, if Egypt
were restricted to a reasonable annuity, larger sums would be made available for im-
provement.
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existed when operation was in the Universal Suez Canal Company.
2 09
Since the interests of the users never predominated within the company
itself,210 tolls remained high and improvements inadequate. In contrast,
since profit is not sought in the operation of the Panama Canal,2 1 ' all
necessary improvements in that canal can be undertaken with tolls kept at
a relatively low level. 212  However, the United States' policy of operating
the Panama Canal on a non-profit basis is self-imposed.213
Therefore, absent new international regulation, Egypt, having nation-
alized the Universal Suez Canal Company and cancelled the canal con-
cession, is in no sense restrained from pursuing a profit-making policy
similar to that of the old company.2 14  Indeed, the diversion of profit to
the Egyptian government was the reason for nationalization stated by
President Nasser.21 5 This objective was recognized in the eighteen-nation
proposal resulting from the First London Conference, which called for an an-
nuity payment to Egypt.216 The proposal further provided that the amount
of the annuity should increase and decrease with canal traffic. Such a flexible
annuity would give Egypt an incentive to operate the canal in a way that
would attract the largest amount of traffic. Also, this guards future users
from the burden of a guaranteed annuity increasing the unit toll should
the canal become of less significance.
The annuity might satisfy Egypt's need for canal revenue and yet
place a reasonable limit on profits that may be derived from the tolls. A
sizeable annuity to Egypt seems fair, since her acquiescence in any limita-
tion on profits would represent a concession. Furthermore, Egypt
desperately needs funds to raise her standard of living, and since the Suez
Canal, located in Egyptian territory, constitutes one of Egypt's very few
sources of revenue, it seems equitable for the nation to profit therefrom.
Nevertheless, to ensure efficient and satisfactory operation, the annuity
209. WiLsoN, TE Suez CANAL 109-33 (1933).
210. Ibid.
211. C.Z. CODE tit. 2, § 412 (Supp. 1943).
212. Ibid.; WiLsON, THE Suez CANAL 144-51 (1933).
213. See C.Z. CODE tit. 2, § 412 (Supp. 1943). Contra, OPPENHEim, THE PAN-
AMA CANAL CoNvLicr 30 (1913): "According to Article III, No. 1, of the Hay-
Pauncefote Treaty the charges for the use of the Canal shall be just and equitable.
This can only mean that they shall not be higher than the cost of construction, main-
tenance, and administration of the Canal requires . .. ."
214. In 1883 a group of British shipowners negotiated with de Lesseps a "London
Programme" which provided, inter alia, that net profits above 25% should be applied
to reduction of tolls until such tolls fell to five francs. WnsoN, THE SUEz CANAL
66 (1933). However, this agreement was "waived" by the London Committee of ship-
owners in 1900, and was never adhered to by the company. Id. at 112. Shareholders of
the company have continually received immense dividends, id. at 109-30, at the expense
of high tolls and poor service, which in turn have been reflected in high costs to ship-
owners and shippers and eventually in unnecessarily high prices to the commodity
users. But see, e.g., address by President of the Suez Canal Company at a meeting of
shareholders, June 12, 1951, as quoted by Mahmoud Fawzi, U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL
O.r. Rsc., 6th year, 550th meeting 17 (1951).
215. Address by President Nasser, Alexandria, Egypt, July 26, 1956, THE SUzZ
CANAL PROBLEM 25, 27-28, U.S. News & World Report, Aug. 17, 1956, p. 77.
216. See note 35 supra; cf. Barcelona Statute art. III; Lawrence, supra note 186,
at 69.
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should be conditioned on periodic approval by the United Nations agency
earlier suggested.
21 7
VI. ARBITRATION OF DISPUTES BETWEEN THE CANAL COMPANY
AND EGYPT
Compulsory arbitration of differences between the canal company
and Egypt represents an adjustment of Egyptian rights, for under the old
concessions and agreements arbitration is not necessarily required for all
disputes. According to an 1866 agreement between the canal company
and Egypt, "any disputes that may arise between the Egyptian Govern-
ment and the Company shall . . . be submitted to the local Courts and
settled according to the laws of the country." 218 In at least one situation,
however, arbitration may have been required: In 1968, at the end of the
prescribed ninety-nine year period,2 19 when Egypt was to take over the
company, the value to be paid the company for materials and supplies was
to be fixed "either by amicable agreement or on the basis of an opinion
of experts." 220  This clause may easily be construed as requiring arbitra-
tion, and since it was to be operative upon termination of the canal com-
pany it may be applicable to the present situation. However, premature
nationalization in itself violates a different clause of the same article of the
1856 concession,2 2 1 so Egypt may also have considered herself no longer
bound by the arbitration clause.
No such arbitration provision existed, however, for determining the
compensation to be paid the stockholders, and Egypt might have legitimately
refused arbitration on this matter. Indeed, there seems little scope for
arbitration in the definite standard set forth by Egypt's nationalization
decree: compensation at the rate prevailing in the closing quotations of
the Paris Stock Exchange on the day preceding issuance of the decree,
conditioned on the prior return of all canal company assets to the Egyptian
government. It is possible that the sixth principle might now subject
the adequacy of such compensation to arbitration, since settlement with the
stockholders need not be handled directly but may be achieved by payment
to the company, in which case Principle VI could be invoked as governing
217. See text at notes 188-91 supra.
218. Convention Between the Viceroy of Egypt and the Compagnie Universelle
du Canal Maritime de Suez, Feb. 22, 1866, art. XVI, THE SUEZ CANAL PROBLEM 15;
cf. Joseph Shalam and Sons v. Suez Canal Co., Feb. 17, 1930, Civil Court of Cairo,
[1929-1930] ANN. DIG. PUB. L. CAs. 137 (Lauterpacht ed. 1935).
219. See text at note 14 supra.
220. Act of Concession, 1856, art. XVI. The 1854 concession contained a similar
clause: "On the expiration of the concession, ... an agreement reached amicably or
by arbitration shall determine the compensation to be allotted to the company for the
transfer of its equipment and movable property." Act of Concession, 1854, art. X.
221. Act of Concession, 1856, art. XVI.
222. President of the Republic Order Concerning the Issuance of Law No. 285
of 1956 on the Nationalization of the Universal Company of the Suez Maritime Canal,
July 26, 1956, art. I, THE Suz CANAL PROBLEm 30, 31. See also the subsequent alter-
native offer to pay the average exchange price over the preceding five years. N.Y.
Times, Oct. 9, 1956, p. 14, col. 1.
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disputes with "the company." In any event, Egypt has recently declared
its willingness to arbitrate "the question of compensation and claims in con-
nection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Maritime Company." 2221
This conciliatory approach may well be due to the existence of large amounts
of canal company assets frozen abroad .
22
Two problems remain with regard to the sixth principle. First, its
scope should be widened beyond disputes involving the company. Since
the current differences with Israel require diplomatic negotiation rather
than judicial decision, most facets of that dispute were sensibly omitted
from the arbitration scheme. However, the legality of one aspect of the
Egyptian-Israeli dispute, Egypt's searching of neutral ships for "contra-
band," might well be tested by an impartial tribunal.22 4 It may similarly
be desirable to adjudicate the validity of Egyptian claims .22 arising out of
the Anglo-French invasion, as well as the financial responsibility for the
current canal clearance operation, although the latter question will probably
be avoided by securing necessary funds through a temporary surcharge on
canal tolls.22
6
Secondly, there must be available some method short of the use of
force for gaining compliance with any decisions. Perhaps this was implied
in the sixth principle's directive to find "suitable provisions for payment
of sums found to be due." One means of securing a measure of Egyptian
compliance with decisions is by withholding assets of the Egyptian govern-
ment and the canal company that were blocked shortly after nationalization
of the company. Conversely, Egypt holds a similar weapon, the assets of
British and French firms recently frozen in Egypt. The United Nations
could be made stakeholder of these funds, to be returned to the proper
party upon compliance with the arbitration decision.
CONCLUSION
Until the relationship among nations becomes such that each recognizes
an obligation to abide by its agreements, as construed by an impartial
arbiter whose jurisdiction has been conceded, a convention lacking a provi-
sion whereby compliance can peaceably be enforced is of questionable value
to the parties thereto. The extent to which one nation is willing to rely
on a mere promise of another depends upon its appraisal of the other's
good faith. Few will seriously challenge the good faith of the United States
222a. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, col. 8.
223. See Note, Natiouzlization of the Suez Canal Company. 70 HARV. L. Rsv. 480,
486 (1957).
224. Although it has been reported recently that Egypt might submit to a decision
of the International Court of Justice on the question of Israeli rights to passage
through the canal, N.Y. Times, March 1-1, 1957, p. 1, col. 7, this course seems unlikely
in view of more recent statements indicating Egypt will continue to bar Israeli ships,
N.Y. Times, March 16, p. 1, col. 8, and the implied rejection of a judicial settlement
contained in the recent Egyptian merporandum. See text following note 236 infra.
225. N.Y. Times, Dec. 25, 1956, p. 3, cols. 3-4.
226. N.Y. Times, April 3, 1957, p. 4, col. 1.
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in abiding by its promise to administer fairly the Panama Canal. Unfor-
tunately, the Egyptian government's activities of the past few years,
especially its refusal to obey the 1951 Security Council resolution and its
premature termination of the canal concession, have not indicated a re-
assuring sensitivity to moral suasion. Consequently, unless a new agree-
ment provides some measure of control over Egyptian operation, as by
the suggested U.N. Commission and the right to withhold tolls, the in-
security and mistrust which prompted the Anglo-French invasion will
continue, perhaps reappearing in some disruptive form.
President Nasser's continued refusal to accept more stringent inter-
national controls may best be understood by recognizing the strength of
Egypt's bargaining position,2 7 which stems from its possession of the
canal and which thus far has not been counter-balanced by pipelines and
super-tankers. Moreover, the prospect that force will be used by the
Western powers now appears remote and the effective imposition of
economic sanctions would be both difficult and costly. Accordingly, Presi-
dent Nasser's recent unilateral promulgation of a formula for governing
future operation of the Suez Canal .22 should have come as no surprise to
informed observers. The United States, nevertheless, is continuing to
press for negotiations on an international agreement which would bring
these proposals into alignment with the agreed six principles,229 and Israel
will probably continue to press for canal passage.
Although the recent Egyptian memorandum purports to be an "inter-
national instrument," 23 0 and is to be "deposited and registered with the
Secretariat of the United Nations," s' it is doubtful that a unilateral
declaration could create international rights and obligations. Further-
more, the provisions contained therein fall short of providing a fair and
lasting resolution of the Suez problem. Some sections of the memorandum,
however, might fit within the general phraseology of many of the six prin-
ciples. 33 But as a whole it will be unsatisfactory to the users,
2 3 4 primarily
227. See Wall Street Journal, April 5, 1957, p. 1, col. 6.
228. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, cols. 4-8.
229. Secretary of State Dulles' News Conference, April 2, 1957, N.Y. Times,
April 3, 1957, p. 8, col. 2.
230. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, col. 8.
231. Ibid. The U.N. Secretariat is apparently empowered to accept for registry
and publication only treaties and international agreements, U.N. CHARTER art. 102,
1, which should exclude such a unilateral declaration.
232. Secretary of State Dulles' News Conference, April 2, 1957, N.Y. Times,
April 3, 1957, p. 8, col. 2.
233. The reaffirmation of the Constantinople Convention implies a guarantee of
free and open transit without discrimination, outlined in the first principle. Opera-
tion by the Egyptian Suez Canal Authority and promulgation of a Canal Code cer-
tainly reflect a respect for Egyptian sovereignty, provided in principle two. Fur-
thermore, limiting toll increase in the next twelve months to 1% and allocating 25%
of gross receipts for improvements might also appear to satisfy principles four and
five. The provision for arbitration of "the question of compensation and claims in
connection with the nationalization of the Suez Canal Maritime Company" seems to
meet fully the letter and spirit of principle six. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, cols. 4-8.
234. N.Y. Times, April 1, 1957, p. 1, col. 8; Secretary of State Dulles' News
Conference, April 2, 1957, N.Y. Times, April 3, 1957, p. 8, cols. 2, 5.
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because it recognizes no international control of operations or tolls.P 5
Significantly, the statement provides for settlement by arbitration or judicial
process of "differences arising between the parties" to the Constantinople
Convention.P 6 This is of some value, but since Israel and the United
States, among others, were not signatories to the Constantinople Conven-
tion and thus are not included within the provision's terms, this concession,
like the pronouncement as a whole, will not satisfy the interested parties.
Political and economic pressures may cause the user nations to submit
to terms less desirable than they would otherwise approve. However, if
the eventual agreement does not include machinery for effective enforce-
ment of the promises contained therein, by means short of violence, the
solution will at best be temporary.
J. F. McC., Jr.
235. Although a portion of gross receipts is to be allocated for development pur-
poses, there is no indication as to what will be done with the remainder of the
receipts, nor any incentive provided for reducing tolls.
236. N.Y. Times, March 29, 1957, p. 2, col. 5.
